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State v. White: The "Inadvertency" Requirement
of the Plain View Doctrine in North Carolina
The plain view doctrine holds generally that "if, while lawfully engaged in
an activity in a particular place, police officers perceive a suspicious object, they
may seize it immediately,"' without a search warrant. One requirement of the
doctrine is that the discovery be "inadvertent."'2 In the past, North Carolina
courts interpreted inadvertency to require "no intent on the part of the investi-
gators to search for and seize the contested items not named in the warrant."'3
In State v. White4 the North Carolina Supreme Court recently redefined "inad-
vertent" as applied in North Carolina. 5 Under the new interpretation a discov-
ery is inadvertent if" 'the police [are] without probable cause to believe evidence
would be discovered until they actually observe it in the course of an otherwise
justified search.' "6
This Note analyzes the potential impact of the court's decision to redefine
the "inadvertency" requirement and examines the practical significance of the
new flexibility created by the definition. The Note also evaluates whether the
new definition effectively satisfies the plain view policy established by the United
States Supreme Court and considers the overall usefulness of the new definition
and of the inadvertency requirement in general. The Note concludes that the
new definition is more easily applied than the State's old one and that it affords
police officers greater latitude during searches without sacrificing protections
guaranteed by the fourth amendment. The Note further concludes, however,
that the definition fails to effectuate one of the "plain view" policies-safeguard-
ing against "pretext" searches-set forth by the United States Supreme Court.7
Because North Carolina's new definition cures problems sometimes associated
with specificity in search warrants, it admittedly clarifies application of the plain
view doctrine in the narrow class of cases to which it applies. 8 However, the
new definition accomplishes this result at the expense of the safeguards provided
by the old definition against "pretext" searches, perhaps the greater of the two
problems, and one of the primary evils against which the inadvertency require-
ment once protected.9
In the late months of 1985 the neighborhood surrounding Charlotte's South
Mecklenburg High School suffered a rash of break-ins. 10 Defendant Danny
White became a suspect after police observed several items stolen from an area
1. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983).
2. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).
3. State v. Williams, 315 N.C. 310, 319, 338 S.E.2d 75, 81 (1986).
4. 322 N.C. 770, 370 S.E.2d 390, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988).
5. Id. at 774, 370 S.E.2d at 393.
6. Id. (quoting United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th Cir. 1979)).
7. A majority of the Supreme Court has not, however, agreed on the particulars of the plain
view doctrine. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
10. White, 322 N.C. at 771, 370 S.E.2d at 391.
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residence in his station wagon parked in the school's parking lot on January 4,
1986. 11 On the strength of their observation of the stolen property and of infor-
mation from an informant, Mecklenburg County police officers obtained a war-
rant to search White's residence. 12 The warrant application listed as items to be
seized a stolen stereo, watch, and two pistols, 13 all observed by the informant
while in White's house.14
Five officers executed the warrant on January 16, recovering only one of the
listed items.15 The officers also had with them, however, fifteen police incident
reports listing property stolen during other area break-ins, 16 so that " 'the prop-
erty listed on these Police Reports... [could] be compared with property that
may have been found in the residence.' "17 The officers seized fifty-four addi-
tional items,18 some from these lists, and some that were on neither the warrant
nor the lists, but were stolen in break-ins under investigation by the officers'
counterpart city police force.19
At trial White argued that his fourth and fourteenth amendment rights
were violated by the seizure of the items not listed in the warrant. 20 The search
and seizure, he contended, met none of the exceptions to the fourth amend-
ment's warrant requirement. 21 The State argued that the search and seizure
satisfied the requirements of the "plain view" exception to the warrant require-
ment.22 The trial court agreed with the State. The items seized by the police
were admitted into evidence 23 and defendant was convicted of felonious posses-
sion of stolen property. 24
The North Carolina Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the convic-
tion.25 It held that the search and seizure failed to satisfy the "inadvertency"
11. Id.
12. Id. at 771-72, 370 S.E.2d at 391.
13. Id. at 780, 370 S.E.2d at 396.
14. Id. at 772, 370 S.E.2d at 391.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 780, 370 S.E.2d at 397.
17. Id. at 781, 370 S.E.2d at 397 (quoting the officer who secured the search warrant) (emphasis
removed).
18. Id. at 780, 370 S.E.2d at 397.
19. Id. at 772, 370 S.E.2d at 392.
20. Id. at 772-73, 370 S.E.2d at 392. Defendant did not allege violations of his rights under the
North Carolina Constitution; thus, the issue was decided under the United States Constitution. Id.
at 773, 370 S.E.2d at 392. The fourth amendment, which contains the warrant requirement, was
held applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in 1949. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S.
25, 27-28 (1949).
21. White, 322 N.C. at 772-73, 370 S.E.2d at 392. See infra notes 43-55 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the warrant requirement and its exceptions.
22. White, 322 N.C. at 773, 370 S.E.2d at 392. See infira notes 56-64 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the plain view exception.
23. White, 322 N.C. at 772, 370 S.E.2d at 392.
24. Id. at 771, 370 S.E.2d at 391. White was convicted of six counts of felonious possession of
stolen property and two counts of misdemeanor possession of stolen property. Id.
25. State v. White, 87 N.C. App. 311, 361 S.E.2d 301 (1987), rev'd, 322 N.C. 770, 370 S.E.2d
390, cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988). The court reversed seven of the eight counts of possession of
stolen property. Id. at 324-25, 361 S.E.2d at 308-09.
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requirement 26 of the plain view exception as mandated by the United States
Supreme Court.2 7 The court interpreted this requirement to mean that the dis-
covery of evidence must be "unanticipated" for the plain view exception to ap-
ply.28 The court reasoned that because the officers "carried the incident reports
with them for the specific purpose of searching for and seizing items found in
defendant's residence that comported with items listed in the reports,"' 29 the
discovery of the stolen items was not "unanticipated." '30
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Martin, re-
versed the court of appeals, 3 1 holding that it had misdefined "inadvertent."'32
The court, without explanation, chose to apply the definition of "inadvertent"
established by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Hare33 rather than the definition established in its own earlier deci-
sions. 34 Under the newly adopted definition, inadvertence "'means that the po-
lice must be without probable cause to believe evidence would be discovered
until they actually observe it in the course of an otherwise justified search.' -35
Applying this definition to the seizure of the items listed on the incident reports,
the court concluded that the officers did not have probable cause to search for
the items and, consequently, that their discovery was inadvertent. 36 Accord-
ingly, the inadvertency requirement of the plain view exception was satisfied,
and the seizure was within the bounds of the Constitution.37
Justice Frye, dissenting,38 argued that the court's adoption of the Sixth Cir-
cuit's definition of "inadvertence" was a "drastic departure" from its own prece-
26. See infra notes 65-140 and accompanying text for a discussion of the inadvertency
requirement.
27. White, 87 N.C. App. at 321-22, 361 S.E.2d at 307.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 322, 361 S.E.2d at 307.
30. Id.
31. White, 322 N.C. at 777, 370 S.E.2d at 395. The reversal covered only those items that were
listed on the incident reports but not on the warrant. Id. The supreme court affirmed the court of
appeals' finding that the seizure of the items that were listed on neither the warrant nor the incident
reports was illegal. Id. at 778, 370 S.E.2d at 395. This Note addresses only those items that were
listed on the incident reports.
32. Id. at 773, 370 S.E.2d at 392.
33. 589 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1979).
34. White, 322 N.C. at 774, 370 S.E.2d at 393. See State v. Williams, 315 N.C. 310, 319, 338
S.E.2d 75, 81 (1986); State v. Richards, 294 N.C. 474, 489-90, 242 S.E.2d 844, 854 (1978). This
definition holds that "there must be no intent on the part of the investigators to search for and seize
the contested items not named in the warrant." Richards, 294 N.C. at 489-90, 242 S.E.2d at 854.
35. White, 322 N.C. at 774, 370 S.E.2d at 393 (quoting United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291,
1294 (6th Cir. 1979)). "Probable cause" exists when "[a]n apparent state of facts [is] found to exist
upon reasonable inquiry... which would induce a reasonably intelligent and prudent man to believe,
in a criminal case, that the accused person had committed the crime charged," BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 1081 (5th ed. 1979), or, in the case of a search, to believe that particular evidence will be
found in a particular location.
36. White, 322 N.C. at 776, 370 S.E.2d at 394.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 780-83, 370 S.E.2d at 396-98 (Frye, J., dissenting). Justice Frye dissented only from
that portion of the opinion holding that the discovery of items not mentioned in the application for
the search warrant was inadvertent and that the items were admissible under the plain view doctrine.
Id. at 783, 370 S.E.2d at 398 (Frye, J., dissenting).
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dent.39 He applied the principle established in the court's earlier cases-that
"for a discovery to be inadvertent, there must be no intent on the part of the
investigators to search for and seize contested items not named in the war-
rant" 4°-and concluded that the discovery of the items listed on the incident
reports was not inadvertent. 4 1 Consequently, he argued, the police officers'
seizure did not satisfy the requirements of the plain view exception.42
The fourth amendment was adopted in direct response to the oppressive
search and seizure laws of England,4 3 heartily rejected by the American colo-
nists. It provides,
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.44
The amendment serves two constitutional goals: it prohibits searches not
based on probable cause, and it requires that searches deemed necessary be as
limited as possible.45 The goals are effectuated by the requirement that probable
cause be evaluated by a neutral judicial official4 6 and by the requirement that
warrants specifically list the place and items for which the power to search is
authorized.4 7
39. Id. at 780, 370 S.E.2d at 396 (Frye, J., dissenting).
40. State v. Richards, 294 N.C. 474, 489-90, 242 S.E.2d 844, 854 (1978) (emphasis added); see
also State v. Williams, 315 N.C. 310, 319, 338 S.E.2d 75, 81 (1986) ("no intent" interpretation
restated with approval).
41. White, 322 N.C. at 782, 370 S.E.2d at 397 (Frye, J., dissenting).
42. Id. at 783, 370 S.E.2d at 398 (Frye, J., dissenting).
43. See, eg., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980) ("It is familiar history that indis-
criminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 'general warrants' were the imme-
diate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment."); Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 312 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) ("The very purpose of the Fourth Amend-
ment was to outlaw such [general] searches .. "); Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 481 (1965) (The
framers' intent was that the people should be secure "from intrusion and seizure by officers acting
under the unbridled authority of a general warrant.").
44. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
45. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971). For other discussions of the twin
goals, see Lewis & Mannle, Warrantless Searches and the "Plain View" Doctrine: Current Perspec-
tive, 12 CRIM. L. BULL. 5, 17 (Number 1, 1976); Comment, Constitutional Law-Fourth Amend-
ment-Plain View Exception to the Warrant Requirement-Exigent Circumstances-Washington v.
Chrisman, 29 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 125, 132-33 (1984).
46. See, eg., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968). The Court stated,
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes meaningful only when it is assured that at
some point the conduct of those charged with enforcing the laws can be subjected to the
more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge who must evaluate the reasonableness of a par-
ticular search or seizure in light of the particular circumstances.
Id. at 21-22. For other discussions of the neutral magistrate requirement see Coolidge, 403 U.S. at
449-50; 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.2 (2d ed. 1987).
47. In Marron v. United States the Court stated,
The requirement that warrants shall particularly describe the things to be seized makes
general searches under them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a war-
rant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the
officer executing the warrant.
Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); see also State v. Williams, 315 N.C. 310, 317, 338
1248 [Vol. 67
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Like most constitutional rules, the fourth amendment's warrant require-
ment has exceptions. 48 The Supreme Court has upheld warrantless searches
based on, among other things, hot pursuit,49 automobile searches, 50 searches
incidental to arrests, 51 border searches,52 "stop and frisk" situations,53 road-
blocks, 54 and, as this Note discusses, observation of evidence resting in "plain
view." 55
The Supreme Court first formally recognized the "plain view" exception in
1971 in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.5 6 In Coolidge police searched defendant's
car pursuant to a warrant, discovering evidence that contributed to his convic-
tion for a recent murder.5 7 The Supreme Court held that the warrant issued for
the search was invalid 58 and entertained arguments by the State that, notwith-
standing the invalidity of the warrant, the evidence fit any of several exceptions
to the warrant requirement.5 9 One of those arguments was that the car, itself an
instrumentality of the crime, could lawfully be searched by the officers because it
was in their plain view. 60
S.E.2d 75, 80 (1986) ("The fourth amendment's requirement that warrants must particularly de-
scribe the items to be searched for and seized is designed to prevent ... general searches.").
48. For discussions of the exceptions, see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 735-36 (1983); Lewis &
Mannle, supra note 45, at 6; Note, Texas v. Brown: The Plain View Doctrine Stretched Beyond the
Visual, 16 U. WEST L.A. L. REV. 151, 157 & n.26 (1984). "For the most part, these exceptions are
based upon a conclusion that under certain circumstances, the exigencies of a situation make imme-
diate search and seizure without benefit of a warrant imperative." United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d
1291, 1293 (6th Cir. 1979).
The general statement of the amendment's rule is that" 'searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'" Coo-
lidge, 403 U.S. at 454-55 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
49. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
50. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982).
51. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
52. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
53. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
54. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
55. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
56. Id. The Court had implicitly recognized the doctrine on a number of earlier occasions. For
accounts of the pre-Coolidge history of the exception, see Lewis & Mannle, supra note 45, at 7-17;
Comment, supra note 45, at 133-41; Note, Criminal Procedure-The Supreme Court Takes a Stance
With Plain View Searches and Seizures-Arizona v. Hicks, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 331, 334-38
(1988).
For significant Supreme Court plain view cases since Coolidge, see Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S.
321 (1987) (holding that officers must have probable cause to believe that items are related to crimi-
nal activity in order to seize them under plain view doctrine); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983)
(applying the plain view doctrine to an automobile search); Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1
(1982) (holding that officer may accompany arrested person into private areas after arrest and may
seize items spotted in plain view in the process).
57. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 445-48.
58. Id. at 453. The warrant was invalid because it was not issued by a "neutral and detached"
magistrate. It had been issued by the state's Attorney General who had himself earlier assumed
command of the investigation. Id. For an analysis of this aspect of the Coolidge decision, see The
Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 238-41 (1971) [hereinafter The Supreme Court].
59. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 453. The State argued that the evidence could be seized incidentally
to the arrest, id. at 455-57, that it could be seized in an automobile search, id. at 458-64, and that it
could be seized because it was in plain view, id. at 464-73.
60. Id. at 464.
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The Court rejected this argument, 61 but in the process defined the parame-
ters of the plain view exception.62 The plurality opinion, authored by Justice
Stewart, 63 held that a plain view discovery does not violate the fourth amend-
ment if three conditions are met: (1) the initial intrusion bringing the officer into
contact with the evidence in plain view must be lawful; (2) the incriminating
character of the item discovered must be immediately apparent; and (3) the dis-
covery of the object must be "inadvertent." 64
Of the three requirements for a plain view discovery, inadvertency has been
the most troublesome. 65 The requirement is designed to keep initially valid (and
therefore limited) searches from turning into general searches by forcing police,
"where the discovery is anticipated, where [they] know in advance the location
of the evidence and intend to seize it," 66 to include the evidence in the initial
warrant.67 The warrantless seizure of an inadvertently discovered piece of evi-
61. Id.
62. Id. at 465-471. Justice Stevens noted in Coolidge, as did Justice Rehnquist in Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983), that plain view is not so much an independent exception as "an exten-
sion of whatever the prior justification for an officer's 'access to an object' may be." Id. at 738-39.
"[P]lain view provides grounds for seizure of an item when an officer's access to an object has some
prior justification under the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 738. For similar comments, see Coolidge,
403 U.S. at 466.
63. This was a particularly confusing plurality opinion, with the various Justices creating a
veritable web ofjoinders and dissents from portions of each others' opinions. In all, five opinions
were filed. The situation led Professor Brandis, in his work on North Carolina evidence, to direct to
Coolidge "those readers possessing a capacity superior to that of this writer to determine what was
decided by whom." 1 STANSBURY's NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 121a n.22 (Brandis Rev.
1973).
64. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 466. The plurality seemed to suggest an exception to the inadvertency
requirement. During its explanation of the requirement the opinion states,
But to extend the scope of such an intrusion to the seizure of objects-not contraband nor
stolen nor dangerous in themselves-which the police know in advance they will find in
plain view and intend to seize, would fly in the face of the basic rule that no amount of
probable cause can justify a warrantless seizure.
Id. at 471 (emphasis added). In the very next paragraph, when the Court begins to apply the plain
view doctrine to the seizure of Coolidge's car, the Court notes that "this is not a ease involving
contraband or stolen goods or objects dangerous in themselves." Id. at 472. Thus the plurality
suggested that a discovery of these items would not need to be inadvertent at all. Justice White,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, criticized this distinction as "reminiscent of the confusing
and unworkable [mere evidence] approach that [he] thought Warden v. Hayden ... had firmly put
aside." Id. at 519 (White, J., concurring and dissenting). In Warden v. Hayden the Court had
abolished the "mere evidence" rule, which prohibited the seizure of items not contraband, stolen
goods, or objects dangerous in themselves. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1966).
While the items seized in White were in fact stolen property, the North Carolina Supreme Court
did not mention this possible exception to the inadvertency requirement. For discussions of this
possible exception to the requirement, see Cronin, Plain View and Party Balloons, 8 OKLA. CITY
U.L. REV. 161, 172-73 (1983); Note, "Plain View"--Anything but Plain: Coolidge Divides the Lower
Courts, 7 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 489, 511-13 (1974); Note, Retreating from Plain View: Texas v. Brown,
37 Sw. L.J. 841, 847-48 (1983).
65. See, eg., Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983) (hinting at the continuing discord
within the Court regarding the requirement: "Whatever may be the final disposition of the 'inadver-
tence' element of 'plain view,' . . ."); United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1294 (6th Cir. 1979)
("Interpreting Coolidge is not an easy task .... "); Lewis & Mannle, supra note 45, at 17 ("[T]he
result of these differing views [on the inadvertency requirement] by the Justices in Coolidge is that
the Constitutional standards justifying a warrantless seizure of criminal evidence under the plain
view doctrine are far from clear.").
66. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 470.
67. Id. at 469-71.
1250 [Vol. 67
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dence causes only "minor peril to Fourth Amendment protections," according
to the Coolidge plurality, while reaping a "major gain in effective law enforce-
ment." 68 Requiring the police to ignore the evidence until they have obtained a
warrant particularly describing it would be a needless, and sometimes danger-
ous, inconvenience. 69
The problem with the requirement is that courts have not been sure what
"inadvertent" means in constitutional terms. Because of the Supreme Court's
failure to define the level of expectation required to make a discovery inadver-
tent,70 development of the doctrine at the state level has been confused and in-
consistent. 7 1 Some courts, recognizing that the opinion of a mere plurality of
the Court is not binding on them,72 have chosen not to apply the requirement. 73
Most states, however, have accepted the notion of inadvertency but have en-
countered difficulty in defining it.74
North Carolina is among the states that apply the inadvertency requirement
to plain view discoveries,75 and State v. White is the State's most recent step in
distilling an appropriate definition. Prior to White, the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that a discovery is inadvertent if "there [is] no intent on the part of
the investigators to search for and seize the contested items not named in the
warrant."' 76 In White, however, the court changed stride, setting the old defini-
tion aside without explanation and adopting the definition of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Hare.77 This definition holds that
a discovery is inadvertent if "the police [are] without probable cause to believe
68. Id. at 467.
69. Id. at 467-68.
70. See State v. White, 322 N.C. 770, 773, 370 S.E.2d 390, 392, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 399
(1988); United States v. Hare, 589 F.2d 1291, 1293 (6th Cir. 1979); 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 46, at
§ 4.1 l(d); Comment, Criminal Procedure-"Inadvertence'" The Increasingly Vestigial Prong of the
Plain View Doctrine, 10 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 399, 401 (1980); The Supreme Court, supra note 58, at
244.
71. Comment, supra note 70, at 401.
72. Justice Rehnquist noted in Texas v. Brown that the Coolidge plurality opinion is not binding
precedent. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983). He noted further, however, that "it should
obviously be the point of reference for further discussion of the issue." Id.
Indeed, Justice White continues to reiterate his objection to the inadvertency requirement. See
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1987) (White, J., concurring); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 744 (1983) (White, J., concurring).
73. See, eg., United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1101 n.3 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 419
U.S. 895 (1974) (choosing not to apply the rule in favor of a decision on other grounds); United
States v. Santana, 485 F.2d 365, 369-70 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 931 (1974) (questioning
the viability of the rule); North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 307-08, 502 P.2d 1305, 1308-09,
104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 836 (1972) (rejecting the requirement: "If the plurality opinion in Coolidge were
entitled to binding effect as precedent, we would have difficulty distinguishing its holding from the
instant case .... [However,] the 'plain view' issue raised by the plurality opinion was in fact consid-
ered by an equally divided court, and hence was not actually decided in Coolidge."); State v. King,
191 N.W.2d 650, 655 (Iowa 1971) (choosing not to apply the rule), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 908 (1972).
74. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 746 & n.2 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring); Comment, supra
note 70, at 401; Note, Look But Don't Touch-The Limits of the Plain View Doctrine Following
Arizona v. Hicks, 10 GEo. MASON U.L. REv. 533, 536 (1988); 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note 46, at
§ 4.11(d).
75. See, eg., White, 322 N.C. at 773, 370 S.E.2d at 392; State v. Williams, 315 N.C. 310, 317,
338 S.E.2d 75, 80 (1986); State v. Richards, 294 N.C. 474, 489, 242 S.E.2d 844, 854 (1978).
76. Williams, 315 N.C. at 319, 338 S.E.2d at 81.
77. 589 F.2d 1291 (6th Cir. 1979).
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evidence would be discovered until they actually observe it in the course of an
otherwise justified search."'7 8 The North Carolina court took not only the bag
but also the baggage from the Hare court, adopting not only its definition but
also its reasoning. 79 The court observed,
There are many times when a police officer may 'expect' to find evi-
dence in a particular place, and that expectation may range from a
weak hunch to a strong suspicion. However, the Fourth Amendment
prohibits either a warrant to issue or search based on such an expecta-
tion. Yet if in the course of an intrusion wholly authorized by another
legitimate purpose, that hunch or suspicion is confirmed by an actual
observation, the police are in precisely the same position as if they were
taken wholly by surprise by the discovery. The same exigent circum-
stances exist, and no warrant could have been obtained before the
discovery.8 0
The court reasoned that a legitimately inadvertent discovery creates a situation
meriting an exception to the warrant requirement, for to leave the evidence
alone while obtaining a warrant would be to risk its loss altogether. 81 The
seizure of the evidence in this situation, the court decided, creates "no significant
diminution of fourth amendment privacy protections."'8 2
When a court defines "inadvertency," it is actually defining a level of expec-
tation that a police officer may have that he will find a piece of evidence for
which he lacks probable cause during an otherwise justified search. Under North
Carolina's old definition, that level of expectancy must be measured in terms of
"intent. '8 3 Under the new definition it must be measured in terms of a lack of
probable cause.8 4 Analysis of the change, then, must address whether these defi-
nitions define different levels of expectation, and, if they do, whether the new
definition increases or decreases the amount of expectation that will be tolerated.
Once the relative change caused by the new definition is defined, an analysis of
its potential impact becomes possible.
The first point to address in evaluating North Carolina's new definition of
inadvertency is whether it is in fact a new definition or is actually just a reformu-
lation of the old one. The court makes no mention of change; nowhere in the
opinion is there language to suggest a departure from the old definition. On the
contrary, the court noted that its result "comports with State v. Williams and
State v. Richards, in which [it] held that to qualify as inadvertent a putatively
plain view seizure must not be marred by police intent to search for and seize
items not described in the warrant."'8 5 If the new definition "comports" with
the old one, perhaps only nomenclature-not substance-has changed.
78. White, 322 N.C. at 774, 370 S.E.2d at 393 (quoting Hare, 589 F.2d at 1294).
79. Id. at 774-75, 370 S.E.2d at 393.
80. Id. at 775, 370 S.E.2d at 393 (quoting Hare, 589 F.2d at 1294).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
84. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
85. White, 322 N.C. at 777, 370 S.E.2d at 394-95 (citations omitted).
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Two factors point convincingly to the conclusion that the new definition in
fact differs from the old, allowing either a greater or lesser degree of expectation
by the police that they will find items not listed on their warrants. First, Justice
Frye, dissenting, accused the majority of making "a drastic departure from [the
court's] cases interpreting the plain view exception."'8 6 Second, the court's deci-
sion in State v. Williams,87 decided only two years before White, implicitly sug-
gests that there is a difference between the old North Carolina definition and the
Sixth Circuit's Hare definition. In Williams, the court noted that "some
courts," citing United States v. Hare, "have said that inadvertence means the
police must be without probable cause to believe that the evidence would be
discovered .... -88 Immediately after describing the Hare standard, the court
reported that "[t]his Court has interpreted the requirement as meaning that
there must be no intent on the part of the investigators to search for ... the
contested items not named in the warrant."8 9 Thus, instead of taking that op-
portunity to adopt the Hare definition, the court implied that the Hare definition
differed from the then existing rule in North Carolina.
Although the new definition appears to be a departure from the old one, it
remains to be seen whether the new definition increases or decreases the amount
of expectation that a police officer may have and still make a discovery inadver-
tently. Rephrased, the question now is whether the "intent" of the old definition
or the "probable cause" of the new one connotes a higher degree of expectation.
Justice Frye's dissent and the language in the majority opinion that the new
definition "comports" with the old cases suggest that the new definition allows
police to foster a higher degree of expectation. Justice Frye noted that the old
definition "was an effort to thwart.., attempts by law enforcement officers to
cloak general exploratory searches under the veil of plain view." 90 He then sug-
gested that "[t]he majority succeeds in dismantling this effort," 9 1 thus expanding
the freedom of police officers in executing searches.
The "comporting" language in the majority opinion also suggests, when
viewed logically, that the new standard tolerates a higher degree of police expec-
tation that they will find objects not listed on their warrants. The court men-
tioned that its result "comports" with State v. Richards and State v. Williams,
two cases in which it had applied the old definition. 92 If the new definition
allows a higher degree of expectation than the old one, then necessarily any
"expectation" discovery that satisfied the old rule would satisfy the new one.
Richards and Williams would thus have been decided the same way under the
new rule and would thus "comport" with it. On the contrary, if the new defini-
tion decreases the tolerable amount of expectation from the old one, discoveries
86. Id. at 780, 370 S.E.2d at 396 (Frye, J., dissenting).
87. 315 N.C. 310, 338 S.E.2d 75 (1986).
88. Id. at 319, 338 S.E.2d at 81.
89. Id.
90. White, 322 N.C. at 782, 370 S.E.2d at 398 (Frye, J., dissenting).
91. Id. (Frye, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 777, 370 S.E.2d at 394-95 (citing State v. Williams, 315 N.C. 310, 338 S.E.2d 75
(1986); State v. Richards, 294 N.C. 474, 242 S.E.2d 844 (1978)).
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that satisfied the old rule would not necessarily satisfy the new one. Richards
and Williams would thus not necessarily have been decided the same way had
the new rule been applied, and thus would not necessarily "comport" with it.
These two indicators suggest that the new definition increases the degree of
expectancy that a police officer may have that evidence not listed in his warrant
will be discovered while still allowing the discovery to fall within the bounds of
"inadvertency." This conclusion is bolstered by the ordinary definitions of the
words used in the two definitions; clearly an officer could have "intent to search"
without having probable cause to find the item in question.93
North Carolina's old and new definitions of "inadvertent" represent the two
commonly considered possible definitions. 94 The switch from an intent-based
definition to a probable cause-based definition adds the State to the growing
trend of other jurisdictions making this choice. 95 Despite this trend commenta-
tors have criticized the probable cause rule as being limited in application. 96
When compared to the other available alternatives, however, the probable cause
definition is generally regarded as the best option.9 7
The probable cause rule clearly affects only a very limited class of searches.
It is violated only when police-faced with no exigent circumstances9 8 -search
for or seize items for which they have probable cause and could have obtained
search warrants. Commentators thus criticize the rule as having limited effect, 99
for "if the police bother to secure a warrant they have no reason not to list in it
objects they expect to find and seize if visible .... [I]t would make no sense for
the police, when they have probable cause to obtain a search warrant as well as
to arrest, to opt for a warrantless arrest and the chance of a plain-view
seizure." 100
Use of the probable cause definition causes two further problems, one aris-
ing from the other. Because the rule requires that the police lack probable cause
in plain view discoveries, an anomalous situation will arise in challenges to the
constitutionality of those discoveries. First, police will argue that they lacked
probable cause, while the search victims argue that police actually had probable
cause and could have obtained warrants.' 0' Obviously, those roles are typically
93. See supra note 35 for a definition of "probable cause."
94. See, e.g., Lewis & Mannle, supra note 45, at 18-19; The Supreme Court, supra note 58, at
244-46.
95. See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
96. See, eg., Lewis & Mannle, supra note 45, at 18; The Supreme Court, supra note 58, at 244.
97. See, eg., Lewis & Mannle, supra note 45, at 19.
98. Warrantless searches are permitted if sufficiently "exigent" circumstances are manifest. See
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971) ("no amount of probable cause can justify a
warrantless search or seizure absent 'exigent circumstances' "). The exceptions to the warrant re-
quirement, discussed supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text, generally reflect various exigent
circumstances.
99. See supra note 96.
100. The Supreme Court, supra note 58, at 244-45; see also Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 517 (White, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Only oversight or careless mistake would explain the
omission in the warrant application if the police were convinced they had probable cause to search
for" an additional item, for some reason not included in a warrant.).
101. See The Supreme Court, supra note 58, at 245.
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reversed. Second, this role reversal discourages police truthfulness; officers will
at least be tempted to downplay their expectations and suspicions.' 02
The intent-based definition, followed by North Carolina prior to White,
nevertheless receives greater criticism by commentators than does the probable
cause rule. 10 3 Clearly the inadvertency requirement will have significant impact
under the intent-based definition, because the police often have suspicions that
extend beyond the scopes of their warrants.1°4 Such a rule, according to com-
mentators, sweeps too broadly: it invalidates many "slight suspicion" seizures
because it is difficult for police to prove that they in fact harbored no expecta-
tions of finding the non-warranted items. 10 5 Application of the rule thus results
in the loss of much of the evidence that the plain view doctrine is designed to
permit police to seize.10 6
Thus, the probable cause definition seems too narrow and the intent defini-
tion too broad. One commentator speculates about a rule that compromises
between these extremes, attempting somehow "to distinguish untimed intrusions
from ones in which police deliberately delayed arrest for the ulterior purpose of
obtaining a view of a particular place." 10 7 This compromise is also undesirable,
however, because in addition to proof-of-expectation problems, it fails to ac-
count for the many situations in which police have legitimate reasons for care-
fully timing arrests.
The commentators generally agree that, of these alternatives, the probable
cause definition adopted by the North Carolina court in White is the best op-
tion. 10 8 This definition is the prevailing view in the federal courts 0 9 and ap-
pears to be the subject of a growing trend in the states.110 Though the rule fails
to guard against many planned warrantless searches, it succeeds in giving police
flexibility in plain view discoveries and it protects individual privacy from the
most extreme situations, those in which police have probable cause but fail to
obtain warrants.
The new definition of inadvertency, allowing as it does a greater degree of
expectation in plain view discoveries, creates many consequences. One of the
primary benefits of the definition is easier administration of plain view discover-
ies for both police and courts. Probable cause is a concept familiar to police and
to courts alike, for they regularly deal with it in obtaining search and arrest
warrants and in litigating- fourth amendment search issues. "Intent," on the
102. See Lewis & Mannle, supra note 45, at 19; The Supreme Court, supra note 58, at 245.
103. See, eg., Lewis & Mannle, supra note 45, at 19; The Supreme Court, supra note 58, at 245-
46.
104. See, eg., Lewis & Mannle, supra note 45, at 19; The Supreme Court, supra note 58, at 246.
105. See, e.g., Lewis & Mannle, supra note 45, at 19; The Supreme Court, supra note 58, at 245-
46.
106. In short, "law enforcement would be severely hampered with no promotion of the individ-
ual's privacy interests." Comment, supra note 70, at 404-05.
107. The Supreme Court, supra note 58, at 246.
108. See eg., Lewis & Mannle, supra note 45, at 19.
109. Comment, supra note 70, at 402.
110. Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident" Geog-
raphy Battle, 26 MERCER L. Rnv. 1047, 1083 & n.170 (1975).
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other hand, the guidepost of the old definition, is a much more amorphous con-
cept. While probable cause is to some extent objectively measureable, intent is
largely subjective. Police and courts should thus be more capable now of man-
aging plain view discoveries. The police presumably are familiar enough with
the concept of probable cause to recognize situations in which their expectations
of finding evidence not listed on their warrants rise to that level. Meanwhile the
courts, equally armed with the familiar standard, will be more capable of adjudi-
cating plain view issues.
Another potential benefit created by the increase in tolerable expectation is
a corresponding increase in police discretion during searches. Under the new
definition officers may use their "hunches" more effectively. They may, for ex-
ample, follow the lead of the officers in White by taking precautions to enable
them to take full advantage of suspected but nevertheless fortuitous discoveries
when they arise. 1  It is not likely that the steps taken by the officers in White
would have survived scrutiny under the old rule; 112 thus, that case is a clear
example of a situation in which the increased flexibility of the new rule enabled
officers to be prepared should their suspicions-not supported by probable
cause-come to fruition during a lawful search.
Increased police discretion during searches has one major drawback: it fails
to discourage-and may actually encourage-the planned warrantless searches
feared by the Supreme Court in Coolidge. 13 The Court in Coolidge apparently
intended for the inadvertency requirement to guard against abuses of the war-
rant requirement through illicit use of the plain view doctrine. 114 There are two
general classes of potential abuses: (1) particularity problems, in which officers
fail to list on their warrants all of the items for which they have probable cause
and intend to search; and (2) pretext problems, in which officers use existing
legal means to get into positions in which they can make plain view searches for
items for which they otherwise lack probable cause. Applied to these potential
abuses, the White definition of "inadvertency" guards against the first class 15
but utterly fails to address the second.1 16 In comparison, North Carolina's old
intent-based definition addressed both classes; its treatment of the first class was
imprecise,117 however, and its treatment of the second overbroad.1 8 White,
11. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
112. See White, 322 N.C. at 780-83, 370 S.E.2d at 396-98 (Frye, J., dissenting). By the officers'
own admission, they intended to compare items found in the residence with those listed in the inci-
dent reports. Id. at 781, 370 S.E.2d at 397 (Frye, J., dissenting). To Justice Frye, it was "eminently
evident that the seizure of those items listed in the police reports and not listed in the application for
the search warrant was not inadvertent as that requirement has been interpreted by [the North
Carolina Supreme] Court." Id. at 780-81, 370 S.E.2d at 396 (Frye, J., dissenting).
113. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 471 & n.27 (1971).
114. Id.; see also Note, supra note 74, at 536 (The inadvertence requirement was "adopted to
restrict the use of the plain view doctrine to circumvent the warrant process."); The Supreme Court,
supra note 58, at 244 ("Justice Stewart may well have meant that plain-view seizures must be limited
to inadvertent discoveries in order to prevent the police from using the exception in conjunction with
a deliberately timed arrest to seize evidence that, absent a judicially authorized search warrant,
would remain hidden.").
115. See infra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
116. See infra notes 128-40 and accompanying text.
117. Police officers and courts are better suited to deal with probable cause-a concept with
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then, acts to cure the particularity problems, but only at the high cost of the
forfeiture of any safeguard against pretext searches.
The first class of abuses, consisting of particularity problems, includes situa-
tions in which officers have probable cause to search for items yet fail to obtain
valid warrants specifically listing those items or fail to include those items in
otherwise valid warrants. The first of these failures is exemplified by Coolidge
itself: the officers had probable cause to find Coolidge's car, yet they failed to
obtain a valid warrant.11 9 The second failure arises when officers intend to
search for items A and B, yet, for whatever reason,120 fail to include one or the
other of these items in their otherwise valid warrant. In neither of these cases
will the Coolidge court's interpretation of the plain view doctrine validate war-
rantless seizures, for the discoveries are not "inadvertent." 12 1
The North Carolina definition of "inadvertence" guards against these par-
ticularity problems insofar as it prohibits validation under the plain view doc-
trine of warrantless seizures of items for which the police had probable cause to
search. 122 However, the Coolidge Court noted that if a warrant fails to mention
a particular object, though the police know its location and intend to seize it,
then there is a violation of the express constitutional requirement of "warrants
... particularly describing ... [the] things to be seized." 123 This statement
apparently means that when an officer has probable cause for and intends to
seize an item, the Constitution demands that he obtain a warrant for it.12 4
Clearly the Court would not allow an officer, having failed to so obtain a war-
rant, to rely on the plain view doctrine to validate a warrantless seizure of the
item. Indeed,
to extend the scope of [a search]... to the seizure of objects.., which
the police know in advance they will find in plain view and intend to
which they deal every day-than with amorphous "intent." See supra text accompanying notes 110-
111.
118. See supra notes 103-106 and accompanying text. Officers commonly have suspicions that
they will find items not listed on their warrants; the intent-based definition would presumably invali-
date any such seizures, whether actually driven by pretext or not.
119. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 472.
120. Commentators argue that such failures to include probable cause items in warrants rarely
happen. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. Even when they do occur, however, lower
courts "regularly characterize as 'inadvertent' the discovery of items as to which it appears the police
could have made a probable cause showing in advance had it occurred to them to do so." 2 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 46, at § 4.1 l(d) (citing cases).
121. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 468-73.
122. See supra note 78 and accompanying text for the new North Carolina definition of
"inadvertent."
123. Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471.
124. The Court states that,
where the discovery is anticipated, [and] where the police know in advance the location of
the evidence and intend to seize it... [t]he requirement of a warrant to seize imposes no
inconvenience whatever, or at least none which is constitutionally cognizable in a legal
system that regards warrantless searches as "per se unreasonable" in the absence of "exi-
gent circumstances."
Id. at 470. Further, "the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of
searches and seizures." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968).
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seize [but for which they have not obtained warrants125], would fly in
the face of the basic rule that no amount of probable cause can justify a
warrantless seizure. 12 6
Thus existing constitutional dogma, namely the particularity clause and the rule
that "no amount of probable cause can justify a warrantless search or seizure
absent 'exigent circumstances,' "127 prohibits use of the plain view doctrine on
items for which officers have probable cause from the outset. Consequently, at
least with regard to these particularity problems, the inadvertency requirement
is nothing more than a shorthand reference to existing fourth amendment juris-
prudence; as such, it is apparently nothing more than a gloss on existing law.
The second class of abuses of the warrant requirement, pretext searches, 12 8
includes all situations in which officers "[use] a prior justified intrusion upon a
protected area 'as a mere subterfuge for a "Plain View" reconnoitering.' -129
This subterfuge may be accomplished in at least three ways: (1) officers, having
probable cause for item A but lacking it for item B, in which they are really
interested, obtain a warrant ostensibly for item A and make a plain view search
for item B; (2) officers, wishing to search a car or other particular area, arrest the
defendant for some minor infraction as a pretext for gaining a plain view of the
area; and (3) officers, lacking probable cause but wishing to search a particular
area related to a potential defendant, time their arrest for when the defendant is
in that area; once in, they make a plain view search. In each case officers man-
age, through the use of pretexts, to search for items for which they lack probable
cause, thus circumventing the warrant requirement.
The North Carolina definition of "inadvertence" utterly fails to guard
against any of these pretext searches, and in that respect it falls far short of the
goals enunciated in Coolidge. The White definition of inadvertency is violated
only if the police have probable cause that they will find items not listed on their
warrants. 130 Police officers carrying out these pretext searches by definition lack
probable cause for the unlisted items. 13 1 Therefore the White rule is never of-
fended by pretext searches, and it completely fails to serve the goal of Coolidge.
125. This passage by the Court concerns "warrant[s] that fail to mention a particular object,
though the police know its location and intend to seize it." Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 471.
126. Id.
127. Id. (explaining the requirements under the particularity clause of the fourth amendment).
128. For thorough discussions of pretextual searches, see Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine:
Now You See it, Now You Don't, 17 U. MIcH. J.L. REF. 523 (1984); Note, Addressing the Pretext
Problem: The Role of Subjective Police Motivation in Establishing Fourth Amendment Violations, 63
B.U.L. REV. 223 (1983); 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 46, at § 4.11(e).
129. Note, Confusing Views: Open View, Plain View, and Open Fields Doctrines in Tennessee, 14
MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 337, 354 (1984) (quoting Brown v. State, 15 Md. App. 584, 609, 292 A.2d 762,
776 (1972)).
130. See supra note 78 and accompanying text for the new North Carolina definition of
"inadvertent."
131. The whole point of planned warrantless seizures is that the officers lack probable cause and
must therefore resort to seizure methods outside the warrant process. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note
46, at § 4.11(e) ("Indeed, the lack of good faith would most likely be present when the unnamed
items sought could not have been included in the warrant, as where the police, knowing that they
have no grounds to search the suspect's premises for evidence of crime A, are prompted by their
desire to find such evidence to get a warrant for objects relating to crime B.").
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Insofar as officers know that evidence so seized will not be suppressed, they will
be encouraged to perform these unconstitutional pretext searches. North Caro-
lina's pre- White definition, on the contrary, would invalidate these searches. 132
The failure to guard against pretext searches is mitigated to some extent by
recent United States Supreme Court decisions dealing with the relationship be-
tween the fourth amendment and subjective intent of police officers. In Scott v.
United States 133 the Court cast doubts on the viability of "bad faith" or pretext
as grounds for a violation of the fourth amendment.13 4 In Scott the Court up-
held the wiretapping of defendant's phone even though the officers involved
failed to abide by a court order to attempt to intercept only those calls related to
the criminal activity in question.1 35 The Court declared that searches are to be
examined "under a standard of objective reasonableness without regard to the
underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved." 136 Five years later, in
United States v. Villamonte-Marquez,13 7 the Court drove another nail into the
pretext coffin, 138 again rejecting allegations of pretext. 139 In Villamonte-
132. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
133. 436 U.S. 128 (1978).
134. 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 46, at § 4.11(e) ("The continued vitality of [the good faith] ap-
proach has been cast into doubt by Scott."); Burkoff, supra note 128, at 523 ("Scott v. United States
served to endanger, if not to eviscerate, the pretext search doctrine.").
For examples of cases applying good faith tests, see, e.g., United States v. Tranquillo, 330 F.
Supp. 871 (M.D. Fla. 1971); State v. Van Beek, 87 S.D. 598, 212 N.W.2d 659 (1974); Phenix v.
State, 488 S.W.2d 759 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
135. Scott dealt with Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-20 (1982), which regulates, among other things, wiretapping and electronic surveil-
lance. The Act directs that such surveillance "'be conducted in such a way as to minimize the
interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under [the Act].'" Scott, 436
U.S. at 130 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1982)). Officers in that case admitted that they had made
no effort to abide by this provision or the court order providing similarly, while they intercepted
defendant's phone calls. Id. at 133-34. The Court nevertheless upheld the search as reasonable
under an objective standard. Id. at 137-43.
136. Scott, 436 U.S. at 138. Further, the Court agreed with the Government's position that
"[s]ubjective intent alone.., does not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional."
Id. at 136.
One scholar notes:
The result of the Scott decision is a substantial neutralization of whatever deterrent disin-
centives the exclusionary rule currently produces, because any colorable legal construct
that accounts for the conduct of officers as objectively viewed vitiates at law the conse-
quences of their improper motives.... [T]he fact that [a] search was unlawfully motivated
is irrelevant to the question of the existence of a remediable fourth amendment violation as
long as a court can point to other "objectively reasonable" grounds for [the initial law
enforcement act].
Burkoff, The Court that Devoured the Fourth Amendment: The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclu-
sionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L REV. 151, 189-90 (1979).
137. 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
138. Burkoff, supra note 128, at 524. Burkoff argues that while seriously injured, the pretext
doctrine is not dead. See id. He also argues for its rapid resuscitation. Id. at 548-50.
139. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 584 n.3. Pretext searches are, of course, unconstitutional
as end runs around the fourth amendment. After Scott and Villamonte-Marquez, however, subjec-
tive intent is an unacceptable way to prove a violation; indeed, this evidence is irrelevant to the
calculus. Scott, 436 U.S. at 136. Other approaches are sometimes advanced for guarding against
pretexts. Professor LaFave, for example, advocates extra consideration of standard police
procedures:
[T]he Scott approach of disregarding [the subjective intent of the officers] ... is correct...
provided there are more reliable and feasible means of determining in a particular case
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Marquez the Court upheld the offshore boarding of a ship by customs officials,
ostensibly pursuant to a customs statute, despite allegations that use of the stat-
ute was merely a pretext for a search for illegal drugs.140
Given this apparently blossoming Supreme Court position on pretextual
searches, under which it is all but impossible to allege pretext searches as fourth
amendment violations, the White decision's failure to address pretexts is not as
significant as it might otherwise be. Had the United States Supreme Court
agreed to evaluate subjective intent in determining whether otherwise legitimate
searches are in fact subterfuges, the White court's failure to address pretexts
would have been egregious. Since the Court is apparently shying away from
subjective intent analysis in fourth amendment cases, however, the White short-
coming will likely prove to be insignificant.
The court's redefinition of "inadvertency" in White clearly evinces a change
in the State's constitutional interpretation. The new definition tends toward law
and order and away from personal privacy, broadening the searching powers of
police officers by allowing them to capitalize on "hunches" not supported by
probable cause. Under the new definition police may seize items of evidence for
which they lack probable cause but that they nevertheless discover during other-
wise justified activities. 14 1
The new definition is both a success and a failure. Of the various definitions
suggested by commentators and other courts, the objective probable cause defi-
nition chosen in White seems to be the best choice. 142 It succeeds in one respect
by providing police and courts with a more workable standard than that found
in the old subjective intent definition. It further succeeds, at least in the eyes of
law enforcement, by increasing police discretion during searches, allowing of-
ficers to seize items that they suspect they may find during otherwise justified
searches but for which they lack probable cause.
The definition has one major shortcoming, however: it fails to discourage
pretext searches, the subject of major concern to the Supreme Court and one of
whether or not the challenged arrest or search was arbitrary. This can best be accom-
plished by more widespread application of the requirement ... that the Fourth Amend-
ment activity "was carried out in accordance with standard procedures in the local police
department."
1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.4(e) (1987) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364, 374-75 (1976)).
140. In Villamonte-Marquez customs officials and a Louisiana state policeman boarded a boat
pursuant to a federal statute providing that "'[a]ny officer of the customs may at any time go on
board of any vessel ... at any place in the United States ... and examine the manifest and other
documents and papers . . . .'" Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. at 580-83 (quoting 19 U.S.C.
§ 1581(a)). While on board the officials found 5,800 pounds of marihuana. Id. at 583. The question
presented concerned the validity of the suspicionless boarding of the vessel. Id. at 584. The Court,
however, addressed the subjective intent issue in a footnote:
Respondents, however, contend in the alternative that because the customs officers were
accompanied by a Louisiana state policeman, and were following an informant's tip that a
vessel in the ship channel was thought to be carrying marihuana, they may not rely on the
statute authorizing boarding for inspection of the vessel's documentation. This line of rea-
soning was rejected in a similar situation in Scott, and we again reject it.
Id. at 584 n.3 (citation omitted).
141. White, 322 N.C. at 774, 370 S.E.2d at 393.
142. See supra note 94-107 and accompanying text for a discussion of alternative definitions.
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the problems that motivated the inadvertency requirement in the first place. In-
stead, by allowing officers extra freedom, the new definition practically encour-
ages such searches. This shortcoming is mitigated, however, by the Supreme
Court's recent suggestions that police officers' sujective intents are irrelevant to
the fourth amendment calculus.
State v. White, in the end, amounts to one more stone's falling from the
initially-weak foundation of the inadvertency doctrine. First, the requirement
was created by a Supreme Court plurality, thus lacking any binding effect as
precedent. 143 Second, it has never been accepted by a majority of the Court.
Finally, the current Court is showing signs of treating pretexts-one of the evils
to which the requirement was initially targeted-in a different fashion, 144 and
cases like White construe the requirement so narrowly as to give it very limited
effect. Nevertheless, the requirement clings to its spot in search and seizure ju-
risprudence and, after White, provides a helpful safeguard against abuse of the
fourth amendment.
ROBERT E. DUGGINS
143. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 130-40 and accompanying text.
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